For much of the last century, the United States has led the world in scientific research, output, and innovation. This leadership was not always a given. According to experts Cathryn Carson, chair of the History Department at UC Berkeley, and W. Patrick McCray, history professor at UC Santa Barbara, America’s dominance in science emerged from significant changes during and after World War II.
McCray explains that while the federal government invested in science since the country’s founding, these investments were largely practical—focused on areas like coastal surveys or agriculture. “Through the early part of the 20th century, what we think of as basic science — areas like physics, astronomy…the U.S. wasn’t really strong in those areas,” he said.
Carson notes that before World War II, federal funding for university or industry science was often seen as inappropriate. “Up through the 1930s, the idea that the federal government would put any money into either universities or industry science was actually anathema in some quarters,” she said.
World War II marked a turning point. As threats from Nazi Germany grew more serious in the late 1930s, federal investment expanded into fields such as aeronautics and nuclear physics—including projects at Berkeley. Carson explained: “World War II completely changed the bargain…The system we have now of federal contracts to universities to do basic research…was all set up during World War II.”
After Roosevelt’s death in 1945, his advisor Vannevar Bush produced a report called “Science: The Endless Frontier,” which outlined a blueprint for postwar U.S. science policy. McCray described how this approach aimed not only to produce new technology but also to develop a skilled workforce: “They recognized we needed to have a cadre of trained scientists and engineers and need to keep them fed and paid until the next conflict eventually breaks out.”
By the 1960s, federal spending on research reached about two percent of GDP—a level designed to support national health, economic growth, and security. Investments sometimes took decades to pay off; for example, Tom Brock’s work with Yellowstone microbes enabled later breakthroughs such as PCR technology used in COVID-19 vaccine development.
Carson pointed out that much technological progress—such as Silicon Valley’s rise—stemmed from defense-funded research later adapted for civilian use: “Silicon Valley was built on microelectronics and aerospace, both funded by the Defense Department.”
Other nations also increased their investments after World War II. Carson observed that countries like Japan and Germany caught up quickly in fields such as advanced manufacturing and microelectronics by mid-century.
Maintaining scientific leadership requires constant effort across all stages—from discovery through commercialization—to preserve advantages for domestic companies.
Until recently, peer review panels composed mainly of scientists determined what research received funding. But Carson warns this consensus is under threat: “It’s only been the past few years that we’ve seen a rising lack of trust in scientists being self-interested rather than finding truth through coordinating with each other.”
Recent pauses or cancellations of billions in federal research grants—and proposals for further cuts—raise concerns about long-term impacts on American competitiveness and expertise production.
McCray emphasized potential consequences beyond economics: “One way these cuts could hurt…is if it makes it so this is no longer a place where people from other countries can come to take advantage of our scientific resources.” He added that undermining expert knowledge infrastructure could make rebuilding difficult if current trends continue.
“It’s easy to forget that U.S. leadership isn’t some fixed, unchanging feature of the scientific landscape,” McCray said. “It has a history…and like any other system it can be degraded.”
